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Essay

The Literary Lawyer
Robin L. West*

Humanistic interest in the various connections between the fields of "law"
and "literature" was rekindled in law schools in the mid-seventies, eventually
coalescing in a modem "law and literature" interdisciplinary "movement," or
enterprise, complete with its own journals, courses, seminars, symposia, advanced
degree programs, and of course major "practitioners" and theorists, many of
whom hold joint appointments in the law schools and English departments of
their home universities. Surely by this point-twenty some years into this
renaissance-it now makes some sense to speak of the "law and literature" movement as a recognizable discipline, or sub-specialty, within both the literature and
legal academies. The movement has, so to speak, come of age. Given this
maturity, it is initially somewhat surprising, and even disturbing, to note that it
is as hard now as it was twenty years ago to say anything about what the
discipline's defining questions, much less answers or lines of analysis, might be.
Indeed, it has become common place, within the law and literature movement, to
insist, in the words of James Boyd White, that the movement has "no
agenda"-that it is entirely too diffuse, and too pluralistic, and that its practitioners are simply too idiosyncratic to discern in the movement any unifying
thread or threads of analysis, and furthermore, that it would be entirely antihumanistic and opposed to the spirit of the movement to impose one. While there
may be common analytic ground in this movement, it would be contrary to the
spirit of the enterprise, and even contrary, paradoxically, to the common analytic
ground itself, to say what that ground might be. On this view, the law and
literature movement lacks, most simply, a point. There's no common direction to
the movement, and certainly no shared ethical valence. Reflecting, perhaps, the
diffuse nature of the two enterprises it cojoins-law and literature-and even
more so the postmodern and anti-essentialist premises that have captured the
imagination of so many practitioners in both fields-law and literature scholars
have resisted almost above all else any attempt to suggest a skeletal framework
for their collected work.
This essay will to some degree work against this pluralistic and antiessentialist grain. My purpose in these comments is to describe two general
projects within the law and literature movement, each of which might be
described as wedded to a particular conception of the movement's "point." First,
*
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I will argue that White's protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, for many
law and literature scholars including notably White himself, the law and literature
movement does indeed have an agenda, and that agenda is to construct a
conception of law and of the "good lawyer" that is, generally, humanistic and
literary, rather than either autonomously professional or tied to scientific or
economic ideals. We might call this project, this agenda, and this claimed "point"
of the movement, the construction of the ideal literary lawyer. The good
lawyering to which we should aspire, on this view, and the aspiration for which
we should instill in students, is importantly informed not by economics, but by
literary and humanistic inquiry. At least for White, the "point" of the law and
literature movement, like the point of legal scholarship and pedagogy more
generally, is to figure out what it means to "do" law, and to figure out how we
might do it better. The answer given, both by White and the scores of teacherscholars who follow his lead, is that study of the humanities must inform that
analysis.
For others engaged in law and literature teaching and scholarship, however,
the "point" of this movement simply cannot be captured by the normative,
Whitean project briefly described above. Rather for a good number of
practitioners, the movement's "point," if it has one, is almost exactly the opposite;
it is to provide a humanistic basis for legal criticism, rather than a humanistic
basis for good legal practice. What law and literature scholarship provides and
should seek to provide, according to these scholars, is a humanistic or literary
basis from which to criticize, rather than bolster, law and legal authority. Thus,
while the "point" of the movement, at least according to White, is to provide a
humanistic account of good lawyering, its fair to say that the counter-point is to
provide a humanistic account of good legal criticism. We might call this second
project the Critical Project: the articulation of a basis-generally in the
humanities-from which we might criticize law.
In these comments, I want to first describe and then criticize each of these
projects, and the ethical argument about law and lawyering either explicit or
implicit in each. I will then comment briefly on the shared ground of
inquiry-agenda is not too strong a word-which, I hope I can show, these two
seemingly contradictory projects jointly inhabit.
I. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE LITERARY LAWYER
Let me start with the construction of the literary lawyer. Again, my claim is
that the unacknowledged agenda of many of the writers and teachers in the law
and literature movement, is to construct, as an ideal type, a conception of the
"good lawyer," both in the craft and moral sense of the word "good," who has a
literary center rather than either a purely professional or economic sensibility.
Although by this point a sizeable community of law and literature teachers view
this as their primary mission, it has been James Boyd White, of Michigan Law
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School, more than any other, who has devoted the better part of his scholarly
career to this end, and has had some measure of success in achieving it, and it will
accordingly be his understanding of the literary lawyer which I will examine
here.' Central to White's jurisprudential perspective is the deep and foundational
conviction that the language of law can be (and often is) the cultured language of
community, of civility, of nobility, and of social justice-or, to borrow from the
language of the title of his latest book, that law at its best can be an "Act of
Hope.' 2 To understand the law as an "act of hope," is to understand it as a part of
our canonical culture, and to understand law as a part of culture, in turn, requires
a fundamental reorientation of our conception of law, of legal language, and even
of ourselves. To put it in a nutshell, or a slogan, the law, for White, is an art.It
is not politics, and it is not social science. The lawyer, White has argued again
and again, and in a number of fora, is an artist, 4 and should learn to think as such.
It is important to point out that this conception of the lawyer-as-artist, or, as
I will call him, the "literary lawyer," is hardly without historical precedent. As
Robert Ferguson argues in his masterful treatment of the subject, this ideal
conception of law as a part of high culture, and of the good lawyer as engaged in
the production of culture, was eminently familiar to the eighteenth and early
nineteenth century elite "man of letters." If Ferguson's historical account is
correct, then it seems clear that the eighteenth-nineteenth century "man of
letters"-who Ferguson calls the "lawyer-writer"--was at least an important
historical analog of the ideal type of lawyering White is laboring to construct.
Like White, the eighteenth century "lawyer-writer," according to Ferguson's
account, also viewed the seamless web of law and culture as expressive of an
ethical and aesthetic ideal-law at its best is continuous with culture at its best.
Culture had legal authority, and legal authority was a part of culture, and both
expressed the ideals and foundations of a civic republican faith in the possibility
of a well led life within a society governed by the Rule of Law. For the eighteenth
century lawyer-writer as for White, the products of high culture accordingly could
and should be used to illuminate just resolutions to legal inquiries, and, just as
importantly, the products of law-the products of the "legal imagination"--are

JAMES BOYD ,VHITE, ActS OF HOPE: CREATING AUTHORITY IN LITERATURE, LAW AND POLITICS
1.
(1994) [hereinafter ACTS OF HOPE]; JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND
POETICS OF THE LAW (1985); JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND
LEGAL CRITICISM (1990) [hereinafter JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION]; JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL
IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF LEGAL THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION (abr. ed. 1985) [hereinafter
LEGAL IMAGINATION]; James Boyd White, Is Cultural Criticism Possible?, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1373 (1988)

[hereinafter Cultural Criticism].
2.

ACTS OF HOPE, supranote 1.

3. LEGAL IMAGINATION, supra note 1, at xiv; James Boyd White, Law and Economics: Two Cultures
in Tension, 54 TENN. L. REV. 161,202 (1986) [hereinafter Two Cultures].
LEGAL IMAGINATION, supranote 1, at xxiv-xxv.
4.
5.

ROBERT FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1984).
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themselves literary, and should be understood, studied, and produced as such. To
put the point jurisprudentially, "law," for the lawyer-writer, included the cultural
canon: Aristotle's Politics, the Bible, Cicero's writings and Shakespeare's
histories, no less than Blackstone and Coke, were legal authorities, whose dicta
could and should be viewed not just as rhetorical flourishes, but as legally
dispositive: the literary and legal canon, so to speak, were seamless.
Pedagogically, this jurisprudential view in turn entailed a rigorous and
rigorously literary and philosophical education. The elite lawyer-apprentice, in
a course of study that by today's standards is truly off the charts and over-thewall in terms of its rigor, demands, breadth, and depth, was expected to master
the classics, the Bible, great literature, several languages both living and dead,
philosophy, and the physical sciences, as part of a general renaissance education
that constituted-not just complemented-his study of law. The elite, welltrained lawyer viewed the literary and cultural canon as a part of the foundationthe bedrock-of the social order he celebrated and served. To answer deep
questions of law, then, requiredrecourse to insights gleaned from the culture's
literary and philosophical traditions. The man of law was the man of letters, and
the man of letters was the man of law. White's project, against this historical
backdrop, might best be understood as a "resurrection." White is in essence
attempting to resurrect for the modem sensibility an ideal of what it means to be
a good lawyer-both in the craft and moral sense-that was once familiar but
which has now become not only antiquated, but foreign.
Before turning to White's attempted revitalization of this eighteenth and
nineteenth century republican legal ideal, however, it is worth asking why the
revitalization is necessary. For, make no mistake about it, the lawyer-writer ideal
of the eighteenth century is gone. A quick contrast with his interdisciplinary
cousin, the lawyer-economist, should bring the point into focus. It is oftenperhaps routinely---claimed that the contemporary lawyer must have at least
minimal exposure to, if not competency in, the interdisciplinary tools and
accomplishments of "law and economics." Virtually all law students, for
example, at virtually all law schools, will receive, most likely in the very first
semester of law school, some exposure to the logic and impact of the Coase
theorem, economic arguments for and against strict liability, the economic understanding of the negligence system, and economic explanations for the primacy of
the expectancy interest in contracts, to list just a few examples. All law students
will be advised, at some point in their legal career, that it would behoove them to
supplement this exposure with more sustained training in economic tools of
analysis. Most "top-tier" law schools have at least one, and usually more than
one, professionally trained economist on the staff. Any school that does not is
seeking to acquire one, and all law schools strongly encourage their faculty to
acquire basic training in at least microeconomics. If these indicia are any guide,
then it is certainly fair to say that the late twentieth century lawyer does at least
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aspire to be the "man of economics," or the "man of science," just as Oliver
Wendell Holmes, writing at the turn of the century, predicted he would.6
By contrast, no such claims are ever made regarding law and literature
studies. Students are not advised that training in literary skills or some amount of
familiarity with the literary canon is professionally necessary; at most, they are
told that it may help them cultivate habits of mind and heart that may enrich their
legal career; 7 and what they hear, if course evaluations are any guide, is that "law
and literature" is a refreshing and fun course precisely because it is "non-legal"
and of virtually no professional use whatsoever.8 Surely by any objective
standard, "law and literature" is a marginal movement, which, although healthy,
is viewed by everyone but its practitioners as voicing peripheral concerns to the
overall pedagogical and scholarly missions of the legal academy. The late
twentieth century lawyer may be and may even typically aspire to be the "man of
economics" Holmes urged him to become. He by no means is, nor does he aspire
to be, a "man of literature."
What became of the lawyer-writer of the eighteenth and nineteenth century?
Where did he go? How did such a dominant figure become so thoroughly marginalized? What happened? Ferguson provides in his book a persuasive history
of the material and political pressures on this republican, pre-classical ideal of
lawyering exerted by the forces of pluralism, the demands for specialization, and
the industrial revolution in the latter half of the last century. In an important work
that I will discuss in more detail below, Brook Thomas adds another piece-to the
puzzle, arguing that the "constellation of law and letters" described by Ferguson
gave way in the antebellum period of American history to a literary sensibility
which defined itself in opposition to law-an opposition understood in both
aesthetic and political terms. Narrative authors of the "American renaissance,"
according to Thomas, viewed themselves as critics of, not celebrants of, and
certainly not participants in, the legal order. That renaissance, then, spelled the
end of the lawyer-writer. The writer defined himself against,rather than in alignment with, the lawyer's distinctive mentality.
I have no reason to doubt that Ferguson's and Thomas's accounts are accurate
as far as they go, but they are also clearly incomplete. They explain why the
literary writer turned his back on law, but they do not explain, at least to my satisfaction, why the lawyer turned his back on literature. For that part of the picture,
I submit, we must look not to the history of American literature, but to the history
of Americanjurisprudence,and specifically to two jurisprudential developments
within American law schools at the turn of the century: first, the rise of legal for-

Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,474 (1897).
6.
7.
See generally Elizabeth V. Gemmette, Law and Literature:Joiningthe Class Action, 29 VAL. U.
L. REV. 665, 671-72 (1995).
8.
My own course evaluations and student surveys in law and literature seminars, at least, contistently
repeat this theme.
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malism as the dominant doctrinal lens through which both law and lawyering
should be viewed, and then the rise of legal realism as its antithesis. Neither
realism nor formalism-the two jurisprudential views of law that competed
against each other for dominance at the first part of this century-were compatible with the peculiar jurisprudential perspective of the civic republican
lawyer-writer. As first formalism and then realism came to prominence, the
literary lawyer had to give way. Let me explain why.
Chronologically and logically, we should begin with the formalists. Christopher Langdell's overriding ambition, and at least for a limited time his great
success, was to establish both the completeness and the autonomy of legal
authority, and to imply from those attributes of law a particular understanding of
what it means to be a legal professional. Any legal question, according to
Langdell, could be answered by recourse to the universe of law-where that
universe is taken to include common law cases, their deciding propositions and
fair inferences which could be derived from them. There is simply no need,
Langdell insisted, for the lawyer, assuming he is properly trained, to refer to
anything other than purely legal materials. The general propositions discernible
in the great common law cases are of sufficient number, subtlety, and reach to
resolve any conceivable future legal conundrum. The lawyer familiar with his
library-laboratory and well versed in the fundamentals of legal reasoning can
answer all legal questions, and importantly, can do so without recourse to high
culture?
Although it is customary these days to contrast Langdellian formalism with
the legal realism it eventually had to combat,'0 for Langdell, his original target
was not so much the realists-with their insistence on the incompleteness of law
and their embrace of the social sciences as providing a means by which law might
be improved-as the pre-classical, republican lawyer writer so aptly portrayed by
Ferguson. What was at stake in Langdell's dispute with the literary lawyer was
as much a matter of professional pride as a matter of jurisprudential definition.
The lawyer's claim to be a "learned professional," Langdell insisted, was in no
way dependent upon his mastery of the literary or philosophical canon. Rather,
the learning at the heart of law could be and should be viewed as entirely legal
and professional: the common law cases themselves are subtle, complex, philosophically intriguing, rich, and sufficiently "grand" to generate answers in particular future cases." There is no need, Langdell argued, and given the growing
complexity and breadth of the law, there is no time, to master the cultural
products of the centuries in addition to contract, tort, and criminal law. A welltrained lawyer knows the law-the law is complete and autonomous. He need not
learn the classics as well.

9.
10.
11.
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If this account of formalism is correct, it is important to stress, however, that
there was shared ground occupied by the formalists and the lawyer-writers. Both
viewed the law as, essentially, complete. Where they disagreed was in their
definition of what constituted law. The lawyer-writer, like the formalist, viewed
the law as a closed and complete system of norms which could and did provide
the means for just resolutions of societal conflicts. Although they disagreed over
what "law" included, they both viewed law as expressive of foundational
principles worthy of celebration and sufficiently rich to ensure both a just and an
orderly society. They both viewed the lawyer as the guardian, the exemplar, and
the articulator of that order, and they were both, for that reason, rested on a
profoundly conservative vision of the purpose and reach of law.
The legal realist, in a history familiar to virtually all lawyers, came upon the
scene at the turn of the century and famously dissented from the view, shared by
the lawyer-writer and the legal formalist, that "law," rather grandly conceived (as
per the lawyer-writer) or narrowly conceived (as urged by the Langdellian
formalist) could resolve societal disputes. Rather, the realist argued, the openness
of norms, and perhaps of language itself, assured a degree of indeterminacy, and
the existence of an infinite number of "gaps" in legal reasoning and legal
authority. Those gaps had to be filled in, and what they were to be filled in with,
according to the realist, was the moral and political inclinations of the judge,
informed by and guided by, at best, the wise tutelage of the emerging social
sciences. By guiding moral judgment with science, rather than law, the judge
could participate in the grand progressive project of moving society toward an
improved ideal. Law, for the realists, should be understood neither as a closed
universe of legal norms fully expressive of every fundamental legal idea necessary for the resolution of all disputes, nor as a conjunction of law and letters
expressive of grand political and civic ideals. Law should be understood as a tool,
to be used by well intended judges attentive to the constraints and lessons of the
sciences, in a quest toward the end of an improved and happier society.
Let me make a three way comparison. Like the formalist, the lawyer-writer
viewed the law as essentially complete-as gap-free. Like the legal realist, the
lawyer-writer insisted that the Langdellian formal conception of law was
inadequate: legal norms taken from purely and narrowly understood "legal
materials" were insufficient to the task of justice or even dispute resolution. But
these family resemblances left the lawyer-writer fundamentally incompatible with
both its realist and formalist siblings. To begin with the realists: although the
lawyer-writer agreed that "legal materials" alone were insufficient to resolve disputes, in every other respect realism was as poisonous to the ambitions of the
lawyer writer as it proved to be to formalism. The realist's insistence on law as
a forward looking tool for social improvement through discretionary judicial
decision-making was utterly antithetical to the lawyer-writer's conceptual view
of the legal universe. For the lawyer-writer, the law, properly understood,
expressed pre-existing philosophical and even aesthetic ideals.
1193
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On the other hand, although the lawyer-writer shared with the formalist a
commitment to law's completeness, unlike the formalist, the lawyer-writer
viewed law as essentially continuous with and inclusive of, rather than autonomous from, culture. The formalist's insistence on an autonomous, specialized,
and technical, rather than literary or cultural, view of the professional was, then,
as contrary to the lawyer-writer's world view as it was to the realist's.
It is in precisely this jurisprudential sense, then, that the competing conceptions of law espoused by formalism and realism, respectively, simply left no
room for the lawyer-writer: between the realist's insistence on the law's
incompleteness, and the formalist's insistence on the law's autonomy, the lawyerwriter's world view was simply "shut out." As formalism and then realism rose
to prominence, the focus of debate shifted away from the dispute between the
formalists and the lawyer-writer-the boundary between law and culture-to the
quite different dispute between the formalist and the realist-the boundary between law and informed judgments of policy. The distinctive view of law held by
the lawyer-writer-as both complete, continuous with, and expressive of cultural
and aesthetic, as well as political ideals--did indeed, at least for a good part of
this century, simply whither away.
White's project, then, understood against the backdrop of this history, is to
revitalize the eighteenth century lawyer-writer and re-tool him for the demands
of the late twentieth century. If we keep this history in mind, the project does not
seem quite the nostalgic pipe-dream that it might otherwise. For it is clear that
realism and formalism no longer dominate, in yin-yang fashion, the legal
imagination. Landellian formalism is for all practical purposes dead, and in a
story that is too great a diversion for these purposes, realism has devolved into
mutually unappealing and warring camps: critical legal studies on the political left
and law and economics on the political right. The "center"-in which professional ideals have always been crafted-is wide open. There is jurisprudential
room, now, as there previously had not been, for White's revitalized literary
lawyer.
To be iure, there are important differences. White brings to his project a
decidedly twentieth century commitment to social equality, a twentieth century
critical and progressive eye, and-most important-a twentieth century sensitivity to the magnitude of the injustice wrecked upon our society by virtue of
our history of slavery,-racism, and discrimination, 2 unshared by his eighteenth
century counterpart. Unlike his elitist, albeit "republican" eighteenth century
12. For further discourse on this viewpoint, see White's discussion on Huck Finn in LEGAL
IMAGINATION, supra note 1, at 19, and his discussion of Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address in Acts oF HOPE,
supra note 1, at 294-302. Compare these writings with his reading of Mandela's Speechfron the Dock in ACmS
OF HOPE, supra note I, at 278-94. It is no coincidence that White's area of legal specialization is the law of
slavery, and race relations more generally. The institution of slavery, and the laws that constructed it, strike
at the heart of the ethical and aesthetic sensibility he aims to instill in the lawyering process: a deep and equal
respect for the uniqueness of each individual, and a willingness to attend to the "stories" of all.
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ancestor, White is liberal, progressive, and egalitarian in politics and spirit both.
But nevertheless, the common ground White and his idealized "literary lawyer,"
share with the eighteenth and nineteenth century "man of letters" is striking. Most
important, both White and his ideal lawyer share with their pre-classical era
predecessor a particular jurisprudential perspective, and it is a jurisprudential
perspective which is at odds with both the legal realism and the legal formalism
which have competed for dominance within the legal academy during the century
that saw the end of the "man of letters." Thus, White is deeply skeptical of the
formalist claim that law either can or should be viewed as self-sufficient: that it
needs recourse to no other field for its own completion. But he is equally
skeptical of the realist claim that the language of economics, or the language of
social science, should be employed to "fill in the gaps," so as to point us to
justice.13 Like the eighteenth century man of letters-and really only like the
eighteenth century man of letters-White is convinced that the part of law which
cannot be or should not be understood positivistically can only be grasped
through an understanding of its cultural, and more specifically literary, foundation
and potential.' 4 Like the man of letters, White aims to both "fill in the interstitial
gaps" and fulfill the moral ambitions of law by recourse to a discriminating
understanding of our cultural heritage.' 5
We might describe this Whitean project-the resurrection of the eighteenth
century "lawyer-writer," or, more simply, the construction of the modem literary
lawyer-programmatically in this way. White's attempted construction of the
literary lawyer seeks to reinvigorate a vision of law that first, situates law, or
embeds it, within the humanities-ratherthan within politics, and rather than
within the social sciences-and then analyzes and uses law accordingly. It
follows that a full understanding of a legal question, a legal dilemma, or a legal
text requires a humanistic analysis, just as a full understanding of law requires a
general knowledge of the culture from which the law emerged. It also follows that
the production of a legal text-whether it be a case opinion, a contract, or a
statute-is, potentially, a contribution to that culture and an expression of the
author's literary sensitivity, and to be done well accordingly requires the
marshaling and use of humanistic and literary skills. Pedagogically, an understanding of, and therefore the teaching and learning of, both canonical literature
and the skills necessary to read it critically, are necessary to the learning of law,
because literature is itself a part of law, and law is itself a part of literature. Law
is indeed an expression of power, but it is also an expression of a literary
sensibility, and while the lawyer is inescapably political to whatever degree or
amount of power she wields, she is also inescapably artistic. Her training should

13.
14.
15.

See Two Cultures, supra note 3, at 201.
ACTS OF HOPE, supra note 1, at 182-83.
For his clearest statement of this claim, see Cultural Criticism, supra note 1, at 1378.
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so that when she uses the literary language of law, she
reflect that inevitability,
16
will use it well.
Let me pose three objections which might be raised against this Whitean
project of renewal. The first objection has been most often voiced by feminist and
minority scholars, and might better be described as a wariness, or suspicion, about
the project, rather than an analytic objection to its logic. The suspicion stems, in
turn, from a deep distrust of the literary "canon" that informs the view of law held
by the cultural or literary lawyer, and more functionally, of the means by which
some works but not others become canonized. For whom, exactly, does the "man
of letters" 'speak? From which parts of "culture" does the cultural heritage of law
emerge? To take an example, White has written eloquently on the literary properties of the phrase "We the People"' 7 from the Constitution's preamble. Angela
Harris asks, in response, who the "we" in the phrase "we the people," precisely,
represents.' 8 In the same vein, Judy Resnick and Carolyn Heilbrun, in an article
on the intersections of law, literature, and feminism, question the worth of supplementing, or interpreting, the legal canon, with its notorious exclusions of outsider
voices, with the equally exclusionary literary canon. t9 Susan Mann puts forward
a similar critique, in a thorough and thoughtful piece on the legal and literary
canon in the Stanford Law Review.20 Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic voice
the same complaint, both about the canon, and the modern literary lawyer's
explication of it, in their critical essay, "Norms andNarratives:Can JudgesAvoid
SeriousMoralError?"2' The "man of letters," all of these critics argue, was elitist
and exclusionary to the core, and both impulses were an integral part of his
insistent reliance on the cultural canon as a source of quasi-legal authority. It is
not clear that the resurrection of that part of his vision which seems worth salvaging can be reconciled with our twentieth century democratic and egalitarian
ambitions.
The root of this complaint might be put this way. "Supplementing" the legal
canon with the literary, and the legal sensibility with a literary one, might very

16.

LEGAL IMAGINATION, supra note 1.

17.

JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING 240 (1984).

18. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, in REPRESENTING WOMEN: LAW
LITERATURE AND FEMINISM 106, 107 (Susan S. Heinzelman & Zipproah B. Wiseman, eds., 1994).
In a similar vein, Taunya Banks, who teaches constitutional law at University of Maryland Law School,
has her entire class come to the front of the room on the first day. Then she tells all the women and people of
color to sit down. Then she tells everyone who does not own any real property to sit down. Then she informs
the class that the two or three students still standing will write a Constitution for the class beginning with the
ringing declaration "We the People."
19. Judith Resnick & Carolyn Heilbrun, Convergences: Law Literature, and Feminism 99 YALE L.
J. 1913 (1990).
20. Susan Mann, Note, The Universe and the Library: A Critique of James Boyd White as Writer and
Reader,41 STAN. L. REV. 959 (1989).
21. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Nonms and Narratives:Can JudgesAvoid SeriousMoral Error?
69 TEX. L. REV. 1929 (1991).
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well cure the law of its anti-humanist penchant for stilted, deadened, wooden
prose-a style that kills.22 It might~also push the law's interpreters toward more
"humanistic" understandings of the law's commands. But whether it can ctire the
law or the society law governs of its xenophobic intolerance of difference
depends entirely on the content of the "canon," and on the "liberality" of the
literary sensibility, and on both scores, history does not provide reasons for
optimism. Outsider's voices have historically been censored from the language
of literature and high culture at least as relentlessly as they have been banned
from the language and courts of law. Supplementing the one with the other might
leave both bigger and richer, but supplementation alone will not leave either law
or literature more inclusionary. The misrepresentations of outsiders in law will
only be magnified, should law turn to literature for guidance or inspiration, by the
misrepresentations in literature and other forms of high culture. Law and literature
may indeed come from a common cultural root, but that is the essence of the
problem, not the solution. That shared commonality is an obstacle to overcome
in the quest for true equality, not an overlooked reason for wedding the two.
To this criticism, White has responded with characteristic grace. "We the
People," he argues, is a promise of inclusion, and its meaning transcends the
particular, contingent limitations of the promisor.3 That potential for transcendence is in the nature of language, and because it is in the nature of language, it
is also in the nature of law, and it is in the nature of literature.24 It is why the
specific intent of authors can never be the last word on the issue of meaning. It
is why the law, with its genesis in conflict, compromise, and divisiveness, can be
the vehicle for community, consensus, and peace. Language does not only convey
promises. Language, by its nature, is a promise, and therefore, whatever we do
with language has promissory potential, including our high-minded utterancesno matter how hypocritical or self-serving our intent. Language by its nature
conveys a promise of the possibility of communal, shared understanding between
speaker and listener. That promise, in turn, both presupposes and is constitutive
of true and lasting communities. Those communities are, in turn, the wells of
meaning, from which both law and literature spring. We cannot and should not
blind ourselves to the potential for justice which the promise holds out, by insistently and perversely gazing only on the distance, often vast, between what was
promised and what was delivered. The promise is what matters, and it is the
promise which is, in turn, both grounded in, and ultimately only intelligible
within, the meanings generated by our shared cultural artifacts, including law and
literature both.

22. Milner Ball examines this quality of legal prose in THE WORD AND THE LAW (1993).
23. See James Boyd White, The Rhythns of Hope and Disappointmentin the Language of Judging,70
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 42 (1996).
24.

AcTS OF HOPE, supra note 1, at ix-xii.
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This is an elegant response, but it only partly satisfies. Even if we accept
White's generous invitation to view law and literature in this promissory way,
nevertheless, the content of the promise may be utterly compromised by its historical exclusionary genesis, no matter how broadly we read its present incarnation. Surely we now understand the Bill of Rights, for example, as protecting
the rights of "all of us," and it may be true that we might "just as well" read the
Bill of Rights generously as containing, under the layers of its exclusionary
history, a promise that speaks to that inclusive potential. But it is simply not that
easy to shed the consequences of our brutally exclusionary past: the content of
our rights, even if not their presently democratized scope, bears the mark of our
history. Who is to say what the content of those rights might have been, or might
be, had they been authoredby as broad and representati,e a community as the
community whose actions they now regulate, and on whose behalf, per White, we
should now read their meaning?' Similarly, and more generally, we might
happily claim the Western canon as the shared cultural property of our entire
community, in spite of its historical exclusionary impulses. But who is to say
what the content of that canon might be, had it been so inclusive from the outset?
Our "culture" is indeed compromised by (as well as in part "constituted by") its
historical patterns of exclusion and inclusion, as is our law. With a more inclusive
past, our law and literature both might be very different from their present incarnations, and given that we are governedby at least the former, whether or not the
latter, that fact alone gives rise to a serious problem of justice. Blending "law"
with a literary canon and heritage that suffers from the same flaw obviously does
not cure the problem. Arguably, it magnifies it.
I will return to this objection, and possible responses to it, in a moment, but
let me first point out two additional jurisprudential problems with White's otherwise extremely appealing attempt to reinvigorate, for modern sensibilities and
toward modem progressive ends, the "promise" of the eighteenth century literary
lawyer. Both problems stem from the literary lawyer's antipositivist jurisprudence. The legal world the literary lawyer inhabits is decidedly not the positivistic
world of sanctions, fines, prison terms, and executions.26 Law, to the literary
lawyer, is not, or at least not only, a manifestation of political power. White,
contrary to any number of critiques of his work, 27 has never pointedly denied that

25. For attempts to answer the question, see Mary E. Becker, The Politicsof Women's Wrongs.and the
Bill of "Rights": A Bicentennial Perspective,59 U. Cmt. L. REv. 453 (1992); Kenneth L. Karst, Wonan's
Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447; Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100
YALELJ. 1281 (1991).
26. The point was classically made by Robert M. Cover in his essay Violence and The Word, 95 YALE
LJ. 1601 (1986).
27. For criticism of White on this score, see Cover, supra note 26; David Kennedy, The Turn to
Interpretation,58 S. CAL. L. REV. 251 (1985); Richard Weisberg, The Law-Literature Enterprise,1 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 1 (1988); Robin West, Communities, Texts and Law: Reflections on the Law and Literature
Movement, I YALEJ.L. & HUMAN. 129 (1988) [hereinafter Reflections]. White summarizes the criticism, and
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law is power. What he has denied, and emphatically, is that law is nothing but
power; what he has denied, to put it differently, is that the "rhetoric" that
accompanies the power is nothing but obfuscation, masks, legitimation, or other
forms of disingenuity. For White, the literary, verbal "else"-the expression of
law's power through language-is what holds out the hope, and it is the essence
of his antipositivistic jurisprudence to insist that we must study the language, as
well as the politics, of law. To do so, White feels we must study the language
humanistically and generously.
Nevertheless, although the anti-positivist invitation to focus on the ethics and
aesthetics of the spoken legal word might humanize legal interpretation, and
might push it in a more progressive direction, it is precisely the sort of invitation
of which anyone interested in radical reforms of the law should be extremely
cautious. The literary lawyer may well be an improvement over other modem
ideal conceptions of a general, day-to-day professional legal practice.But even
if it is, it may nevertheless not serve as a workable ideal for the goals or practices
of the legal reformer. Rather, a realistic, hard-headed, Holmesian, "bad man"
positivism may be the better jurisprudential sensibility of legal reformers, and for
utterly pragmatic reasons. To understand what laws need to be changed, overruled, cast out, or uprooted, we need to understand, foremost, their political
impact, not their cultural heritage. We need to know who is hurt, and by how
much, by the effect of law on the lives of its subjects. Such an inquiry is not
analytically incompatible with a humanistic study of law's promise, and of its
cultural heritage, but it is most assuredly different. There is a difference, and an
important one, between a conception of law as a branch of-humanities, and
therefore something to preserve as well as improve upon, and a conception of law
as a branch of politics, and therefore something to use, reform, change, or challenge toward the end of improving people's lives. Holmes' positivistic insistence
that to understand the law we should "wash it in cynical acid" and look at it from
the point of view of the "bad man," if we wish to unsentimentally understand its
true content, contains an important grain of truth for legal and social reformers,
or anyone interested in achieving positive change through law. The invitation to
read law as literature, and to read literature as a part of law, does sometimes
enlighten, and can itself be an important engine for reform: it alerts us,
minimally, to alternative ways of reading and using extant legal authority. Where
the needed reform "goes to the root," however, it can also distract us from the
task at hand.
The second problem with the anti-positivist invitation at the heart of so much
of the law and literature movement is closely related. Whether or not the romantic
notion, oft-repeated by White, that the "lawyer is essentially an artist" does an
injustice to the ambition and self esteem of artists, it may well do a disservice to

responds in ACTS OF HOPE, stpra note 1, at 182.
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lawyers. Lawyers, ideally, (like judges) aim toward justice, and they use law to
do it.
Artists, for the most part, do not "aim for justice," gendered or otherwise, and
neither does the art which is their product. Whatever might be the nature of
justice, it is surely not fully captured by any particular aesthetic ideal,28 and the
suggestion that it is, seems to be simply a category mistake. Legal positivism,
with its insistence on the difference between the political root of law and the
idealistic ambitions of change, between the legal is and the moral ought, between
our ethical ambitions and our legal compromises, between the power that we must
contend with and the ideals we seek to realize, might be, perhaps ironically,
precisely the jurisprudence which not only gives Caesar his due, but which best
captures the virtues which define the moral lives of legal advocates for change.29
The anti-positivistic literary lawyer runs the risk of distracting the lawyer not only
from the political root of the law which surrounds her, but also of the particular
ideal-justice-which remains her distinctive goal.
II. MARTHA NUSSBAUM'S PROJECT
To date, the most promising attempt to further the reconstructive project
initiated by White's ground-breaking scholarship, and in a way that answers all
three objections raised above, comes from a feminist, trained not in the law but
in the classics and moral philosophy. The interdisciplinary and brilliant scholarship of Professor Martha Nussbaum is unquestionably one of the most sustained
attempts to put forward a humanistic account of practical reasoning-including,
importantly, legal reasoning-which shares White's ambitions to re-instill in legal
decision-making a cultural familiarity with the teachings of the Western canon,
and at the same time to do so in a way which will point us toward, rather than
away from, a progressive understanding of community. Although Nussbaum's
work in law is now only in its beginning stages, it is nevertheless worth briefly
characterizing at least the direction that her on-going study of law and culture
seems to be taking, before moving on to the second, and decidedly more critical,
project within law and literature studies.
The work that Martha Nussbaum has already done on the nature of moral
decision-making, as well as the work she promises to do in the future on more
specific legal forms of judgment, shares both deep and surface similarities with
that of James Boyd White. To fulfill ambitions of justice, Nussbaum argues, the
judgments made in courts of law should be informed not only by legal precedent,

28.

White argues that justice is largely aesthetic in a number of works. but most persuasively in JUSTIcE

AS TRANSLATION, supra note 1.

29. This is a recurrent theme in defenses of legal positivism. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, The Dernystification
of the Law, inl ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 21 (1982); H.L.A. Hart, Law and Morals, in THE CONCEPT OF LAW 181
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but by the empathic knowledge we gain through the heart 3° -what she has called
"Love's Knowledge"3 -- and by the learnings gleaned from a critical but
sympathetic and engaged reading of our cultural heritage. They should be neither
rigidly legalistic, as positivists urge, nor rigidly rationalist, as economists insist.32
Nor should they be (nor must they be) mindlessly beholden to the arbitrarily held
convictions of political dominant subgroups, as is claimed in different ways by
various wings of the critical legal community. 33 Echoing White, and echoing the
nineteenth century literary lawyer, they should be, and can be, in a word,
humanist: they should bear the mark of immersion in our culture, and of a learned
sensitivity toward the communities that have created that distinctive culture. Were
they to be, Nussbaum goes on to argue, they would be not only progressive rather
than regressive in political orientation, but would even be, surprisingly,feminist.
When read generously, as they should be, our culture and its literary products,
Nussbaum argues, counsel not only a message of equal respect for women, but
even counsel forms of reasoning and judgment that resonate with modem descriptions of the feminine. The humanistic orientation at the heart of the literary
lawyer would further, not hinder, feminist goals.
Nussbaum's project, in my view, is very likely one of the most heartening
and inspiring, as well as inspired, projects on the legal academic horizon. If
successful, her attempt to infuse legal and practical reasoning with both cultural
knowledge and sympathetic listening, would indeed go a long way toward
answering the spiritually deadening relativism which now plagues both the left
and right wings of the legal academy. 34 If successful, her work might also demonstrate the potential for internal, progressive transformation within and inherent to
a rich literary canon, in spite of its exclusionary history. But more to the point for
these purposes, Nussbaum's project might also provide an answer to the two
objections raised above to the "anti-positivism" in White's vision of the nature of
law and lawyering. A rich, defensible, and noble conception ofjustice, Nussbaum
might be taken to be arguing, simply is embedded in canonical culture, whatever
might be the case of law. If wedded with law in the anti-positivist manner urged
by both White and Nussbaum, and more broadly by the literary lawyer, it would
point our law, and not just our ideals, in the direction of a just as well as beloved
community. This is a project not only filled with ambition, but filled with hope
and vision. There is no doubt but that it is vital work, and it is, I think, work
which should be cheered by both the feminist and the law and literature communities.

30. Martha Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83 (1993); Martha Nussbaum,
Skepticism About PracticalReason, 107 HARV. L. REV. 714, 743 (1994) [hereinafter Skepticism].
31.

MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE (1990).

32.
33.
34.

See Skepticism, supranote 30, at 732.
Id.at731.
See id. at 743-44.
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Nevertheless, and without in any sense wishing to impede the project, it is
worth registering a cautionary note. As Nussbaum herself clearly recognizes, she
is invoking the Western canon, in a sense, against a mode of reasoning which is
itself a product of that canon.35 The anti-historical, super-rationalist, and superrelativist mind set that dominates the legal academy and which Nussbaum
ambitiously, and entirely to her credit aims to dislodge, did not spring upon us
from nowhere; it came from strands of authority firmly rooted in our cultural past.
Before we employ the canon, and even the idea of a cultural canon, against the
morally stunted relativism and rationalism in modern legal thought, we need to
"root out the rot," and that itself may be no small task. If this feminist and
feminized reconstruction of the Whitean project-the partial resurrection and then
reconstruction of a feminine literary lawyer-is to succeed, however, it is
necessarily work of some urgency. If we wish to use our cultural inheritance, and
more specifically if we wish to use it in law, against the deadening impulse of
relativism and more broadly toward the ends of a true community, we must first
be willing to critically examine it, and we must be willing to examine it, among
much else, for its profoundly misogynist underpinnings.
III. THE CRITICAL PROJECT: THE LITERARY CRITIQUE OF LAW AND LEGALISM

The critical project within the law and literature movement is in many ways
the antithesis of the first. In fact, we might best characterize the critical project by
contrastingit-rather than by comparing it-with White's modem revival of the
eighteenth and nineteenth century literary lawyer. While White's artist-lawyer
and the man of letters who was his forerunner use literary classics for the most
part to bolster the law's authority, the twentieth century "law and literature
scholars" engaged in the Critical Project are far more inclined to "use" literature
in such a way as to call into question the law's moral authority. The critical law
and literature scholar uses literature as a means to open law to criticism, rather
than to shield it from criticism within the protective shroud of high culture, and
to push for greater democratization, rather than greater elitism, in legal processes.
In sharp contrast with White's clear pedagogical and professional ambitions,
the major participants in law and literature's Critical Project have no interest in
either creating or revitalizing an idealized form of lawyering, whether literary or
not. Indeed, they have little interest in participating in any reconstruction of professional ideals. Rather, they are interested in participating in the very differentbut equally central-critical goal of both the legal and non-legal academy: the
criticism, from a non-legal perspective, of particular laws, areas of law, entire

35.
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historical legal eras,36 jurisprudential theories, or most generally of the idea of the
"Rule of Law" itself. What distinguishes these legal critics from others is simply
their interest in literature as both a vehicle for this criticism, and a reflection of
it.
Let me briefly describe three examples, and then offer some critical comments. First, Brook Thomas's important work, Cross Examination of Law and
3 7 briefly mentioned above, in many ways
Literature,
inaugurated the Critical
Project. As noted, Thomas argues the historical claim that the great canonical
writers of the antebellum period in American literature defined themselves and
their art in opposition to, rather than as complementary of, the world of law,
lawyers and legalism. In contrast to the earlier "man of law and letters" described
by Ferguson, the great storytellers of the mid nineteenth century-Melville,
Stowe, Cooper and Hawthorne-saw in the legal mind set a world view profoundly antitethetical to, and hostile to, their own humanistic and utopian urgings.
What we see in the great writing of the time is a denunciation, not a celebration
of and certainly not participation in the law and the ideals which inform the legal
mind set. What we see is a criticism, both aesthetically and politically grounded,
of the impulse toward order so exemplary of the legal imagination.
Thomas also argues, however, a less historical and more critical claim. What
the writers of the time demonstrated in their fiction, Thomas suggests, is their
commitment to a particular thesis about the nature of law and legal rhetoric, and
it is a thesis to which Thomas is clearly committed as well. Furthermore, it is a
claim about law which has been central to the critical legal studies now for at least
the last two decades: to wit, that law, whatever else it does, through its rhetoric,
legitimates hierarchical and harmful relations between relatively empowered and
disempowered peoples, by drenching the consciousness of the former with tropes
of entitlement and self-worth, and the consciousness of the latter with equally
compelling and far more damaging beliefs in the necessity and desirability of
their own oppression. Unlike the writings of critical legal scholars, however,
Thomas uses American nineteenth century literature to illustrate the point. Those
writers, Thomas argues, in varying degrees and with varying degrees of success,
dramatized and fictionalized precisely the phenomenon of legitimation that the
critical scholars and historians ascribe to the period; the characters envisioned
were indeed constructed, largely through law, in precisely the manner suggested
by the legitimation thesis. The fictional depictions found in those writers' works
of employers and wage earners, for example, contract in ways that legitimated
and then magnified the disparity of power between them, in ways that perfectly

36. See Brook Thomas's masterful work on the law and literature of the antebellum era for what may
be the best example to date of an attempt to criticize the law and ideology of a particular historical era through
the medium of literary interpretation. BROOK THOMAS, CROSS EXAMINATIONS OF LAW AND LITERATURE:
COOPER, HAWTHORNE, STOWE AND MELVILLE (1987).

37.

Id.
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illustrate the historical claims regarding the time period put forward in Morton
Horwitz's classical critical treatment of the period, The Transformations of
American Law. Thomas's work neatly vindicates the power and logic of the
critical legal scholars' project within law and literature studies, and for that reason
alone, I think, can fittingly be described as the seminal critical work of the
modem law and literature renaissance. The point can be put formally in this way:
if the critical scholars are right to argue that the legitimating power of law affects
our consciousness of our own privilege and injury, and if literary scholars are
right to suggest that literature is one means by which we can appreciate the consciousness of others, then literature does indeed give us a window to the
oppressively legitimating and interpersonally "transformative" functions of law.
Thomas's book, in effect, shows as well as argues the point.
While Thomas's narrative reconstructions depict a legal world of legal
oppression and legitimation in the great literature of the middle of the last
century, my second example of the Critical Project, Richard Weisberg's treatment
of a number of canonical literary texts of the twentieth century in Failureof the
Word paints an even darker, more ominous picture. In The Failureof the Word,38
Weisberg argues not the critical "legitimation" thesis argued above, but rather, the
neo-Nietzschien thesis that one of the most important, if neglected, contributions
of modem western literature of this century has been its dramatization of the
articulate, even verbose, but pathologically resentful and spiritually stunted
"lawyer-protagonist." The lawyer-protagonist of modern western literature,
Weisberg argues, is virtually always a moralistic and moralizing, psychologically
twisted man, who uses and misuses the language of law as a weapon against an
impulsive and stronger man of action39 and toward the fulfillment of ends defined
not by the grandeur of law but by his own neurotic and perverse personal
ambitions. Through close readings of Melville's novella Billy Budd Sailor,0
Albert Camus' The Stranger,4' Dostoevski's Brothers Karamazov,2 and any
number of others, Weisberg has embellished this central claim: whatever its noble
ambitions, precisely because it is so "wordy," law inevitably carries with it the
potential for its own misuse toward the ends defined by the ressentiment of
learned and academic but weak men. The result of Weisberg's labors has been a
body of interpretive essays about literary lawyer-protagonists, and which
consistently assert a view of law, of legal language, of authority, and of rhetoric
that is the antithesis of that put forward by White. The verbal, pontificating
lawyer, according to Weisberg, makes his linguistic "promises" with neither the
intent nor the effect of enhancing social life or strengthening community. Rather,

38.
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he often- albeit not inevitably-makes them toward the end, whether or not
consciously realized, of overcoming the strength of natural action with the force
of authoritative words; toward the end of defeating impulse and health with
neurotic deception; toward the end of realizing, through the wordy forms of law,
the neurotic personal ambitions formed of envy. If Weisberg's reading of
literature is correct, and if the authors he interprets are saying something true
about legalism, then the "promise" of liberal legalism-the governance of
communities through the authority of impersonal law-is utterly compromised
by-not embodied by-the inevitably twisted, envious, resentful, and wordy legal
promises of the man of "law and letters."
How does Weisberg's critical Nietzschian insight about law and wordiness
compare with other critical traditions within the legal academy? Perhaps surprisingly (perhaps not), the closest analogy, I think, is not the skeptical work of
the critical legal studies movement, but rather, the work of at least some feminist
critics of law and legalism. Although he has not himself written on it, Weisberg's
central, defining, critical thesis does resonate with at least some feminist concerns. Feminists too, both in law and even more emphatically in literature, have
been suspicious of the "wordiness" of contemporary, modernist authoritywhether embodied in judges, priests, or fathers-and have struggled to unearth
from history and family less patriarchal, as well as less "verbal" forms of power.43
Feminists too have suspected that behind the apparent peace-seeking facade of the
legalist's embrace of verbosity, lies a resentful, envious neurotic longing for
power, and destructive hatred of natural forms of life. Most recently, to take just
one provocative example, Professors J.C. Smith and Carla Ferstman have turned
the misogynist Nietzsche to their own feminist ends, arguing that the entire
patriarchal apparatus of male control of the female is largely the result of the
attempt of men to use the power of the "word" to attain what they cannot
naturally claim: possession of female sexuality and knowledge of their children's
paternity. 4 There are obvious parallels which deserve greater exploration between
this emerging neo-Nietzschien analysis of the verbosity of patriarchy, and
Richard Weisberg's neo-Nietzschien analysis of the "wordiness" of legalism.
My last example of early writings within the critical or dissident wing of the
law and literature movement is also, although this time more explicitly, driven by
or influenced by feminist concerns. In Legal Modernism,45 Professor David
Luban puts forward an interpretation of Aeschylus's trilogy The Oresteia46 which

43. French feminism emphasizes this theme more than Anglo-American. See, e.g., LUCE IRIGARAY,
THIS SEX WHICH Is NOT ONE (Catherine Porter trans., 1985). For a good discussion and critique, see Judith
Butler, Variationson Sex and Gender: Beauvoir, Witlig and Foucault, in FEMINISM AS CRITIQUE: ESSAYS ON
THE POLITICS OF GENDER (Benhabib & Cornell eds., 1987).
44.
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owes much to feminist dramatizations of that work.47 The Oresteia,of course, is
widely read, and was probably intended to be read, as the first dramatization of
the triumph of the idea of law, the Rule of Law, and legal process over the earlier
and much more brutal and inefficient system of communal control known as
private revenge' On the other hand, it has also been widely read, at least by
feminists, as a parable of the defeat of a political system of matriarchy by
patriarchy: the revengers who are ultimately "driven underground" by the oracles
of legalism are female, the crime which is the centerpiece of the famous trial is
a matricide, and of course, the defendant is eventually acquitted, to name just
three of the many references in the play that suggest gender warfare as a central,
if not the central, concern. In his essay in Legal Modernism, David Luban deftly
ties these two strands of interpretation together, and the result is a profoundly
feminist critique of the very ideals that go to the heart of legalism. What
Aeschylus suggests in The Oresteia, Luban argues, is that the triumph of law,
legalism, and legal process simply was the world historic defeat of the female sex.
Rather than glorifying the virtues of law, Luban suggests, Aeschylus smuggled
into the "subtext" of his masterpiece a devastating critique, according to which
law is and has been skewed from its inception against the interests of the weakincluding the politically weaker class of women. The purported "neutrality" of
legal process, as dramatized in The Oresteiaand as reenacted daily in courtrooms,
is simply a sham. Its goal is not justice, but civic order, or peace, the cost of
which, almost necessarily, is a silencing of the voice, the rights, and the interests
of women. Both in the trial depicted in The Oresteia as well as in modern courtrooms, Luban suggests, the cost of legalism's quest for civic peace is justice, and
at the heart of that question, in turn, is its masculinist drive for dominance.4 9
What are the limitations of this Critical Project? Perhaps the most important
criticism that has been lodged, to date, against the Critical Project tracks the problem noted above with the use of the literary canon toward the end of ennobling
and enriching legal reasoning. The literary canon is for better or worse elitist and
exclusionary by definition, and it should come as no great shock to note that the
voices of women, minorities and outsiders have not been well represented within
it. Criticism of law by recourse to insights drawn from the literary canon, as a
consequence, might for that very reason be fairly tepid at best.50 One cultural
artifact is being critically pitted against another, but the two have more in common than what divides them. The literary canon will reflect the moral sensibilities
of the same elite whose interests are reflected and served by law. Those moral

47. LUBAN, supra note 45, at 318 n.135.
48. For a treatment of the Oresteia that explicates these themes for a legal audience, see Paul Gerwirtz,
Aeschylus' Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1043 (1988).
49. LUBAN, supra note 45, at 306-21.
50. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 21, at 1929; Mann. supra note 20. at 959; Resnick & Heilbrun,
supranote 19, at 1913.
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sensibilities might, indeed, be in rebellion against the legal and political order of
the day. But they are nevertheless the sensibilities of elites. The voices, experiences, and perspectives of outsiders will only rarely infiltrate, and a form of
critique that depends upon the canon for its critical insights will reflect that
limitation.
Let me give an example. It has become relatively commonplace, within the
law and literature movement, to cite Twain's masterpiece Huckleberry Finn5' as
a critique, not only of the institution of slavery, but of the laws and legal sensibilities, as well as the positivistic, legalistic, and property rights-minded view
of morality, that supported it.52 But it also seems fair to say that HuckleberryFinn
expresses the revolt of conscience against slavery which was experienced by and
articulated by whites. Huck is a developed character, and a moral rebel, in the
story; Jim, by contrast, is not. Rather, Jim is developed to precisely the degree
necessary to constitute a dramatic contrast with Huck: he is a loyal friend (while
Huck's loyalty waivers); he is a devoted family man (while Huck's family is
dysfunctional) and he is, from the outset, a truly morally just and upright human
being (while Huck must become moral through acts of rebellion). He is also, of
course, a wronged victim by virtue of skin color, while Huck is not. But for all
of these attributes, he is nevertheless a two dimensional character. The reader
learns much of Huck's mind set and subjectivity, and little of Jim's. This is a
story, in short, about a runaway slave; it is not a story of a runaway slave. It was
not Twain's intent, nor his accomplishment, to provide the slave's perspective.
This is Huck's story, not Jim's. While Huckleberry Finn conveys a powerful
jurisprudential critique of slavery, it is a critique by and of a white man of conscience. It is not itself a slave narrative. Use of works such as Huckleberry Finn
in the canon of literature critically employed against legalism highlights, rather
than cures, the exclusionary history of the literary canon. We might usefully call
this complaint-that even canonical literature which is squarely critical of extant
legal institutions, such as Huckleberry Finn, will convey at best the critical perspective and the reservations of conscience experienced by the relatively
powerful-the "outsider's lament."
How forceful is this objection? As critique, it seems obvious that the
outsider's lament has force only to whatever degree the literary canon is itself
resistant to change and supplementation from the voices of "outsiders." As the
canon "opens up," we should expect to find critiques of law not only sympathetic
to the plights of outsiders, such as Jim, but more specifically, critiques which
speak with their voice and from their perspective. The canon may, of course,
prove resistant to change. Indeed, there is an inevitable and much remarked upon
tension between the idea of a "canon" and egalitarian, inclusive, democratic

51.
52.

MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN (1884).
See LEGAL IMAGINATION, supra note 1, at 209; Reflections, supra note 27, at 129.

1207

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 27
ideals: as Bloom and others have pointed out, full inclusion defeats not only the
idea of a "canon" but the idea of culture. 3 There is also, however, a less remarked
upon but equally inevitable tension between the idea and ideal of excellence and
a steadfast, frozen, resistanceto change: a canon that cannot expand to include
new entries as well as new standards of excellence is not only no longer
canonical, it is also no longer a measure of excellence. To whatever degree the
"canon" truly remains canonical, it must be open to amendment and change so as
to include the works of those artists once considered "outsiders." And, to the
degree that it is open, the force of the "outsider's lament" is to that degree
weakened. As the force of the critique weakens, the case for outsider participation
in, rather than criticism of, the "law and literature movement's" Critical Project
becomes stronger.
There is, though, a deeper problem with the Critical Project, which inclusion
of non-canonical or outsider literature ironically highlights. A contrast of
HuckleberryFinn with Toni Morrison's masterpiece Beloved 54-- by now, surely
no less "canonical" than Twain's novel-illustrates the point. Unlike Twain's
Jim, Morrison's protagonist, the escaped slave Sethe, is fully developed: Beloved
is indeed the story of, rather than about, a runaway slave, and in Beloved we do
indeed confront many of Huck's moral dilemmas, but from the slave's perspective. And the contrast is stark. Sethe's utterly "outsider" world is indeed a
very different, more vicious and more tragic world than even the world the
rebellious Huck confronts. Including study of Beloved alongside study of
Huckleberry Finn at least addresses the exclusionary objection-the outsider's
lament-raised above.
However-and herein lies the irony-one of the most striking features of
Sethe's world is not only that it is so much more horrific than Huck's-or
Jim's-but it is also considerably less textual, and even less verbal, than the
world inhabited by Huck and his friend Jim.55 To put it differently, Sethe's world,
to which Morrison's Beloved gives us access, is itself less governed by ruling
verbal canons from any community, and it is utterly ungoverned by the ruling
canon-legal or literary--of the white world. Sethe's family, community, and
friends communicate in many ways, but strikingly, they communicate in many
more non-verbal ways than do Huck's. They communicate through dance. They
communicate through signs and cues when gags prevent speech. They communicate through the marks left by whips on their backs. They communicate
through ghosts and visions across the divide of death. Only at the end does a
central character-Sethe's surviving daughter-learn to read, and hence take6
tentative steps toward joining the white world of governing canonical texts
53.
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Until that point, the communities in Beloved are built not around textual
consensus, but around direct and physical, or indirect and psychic, interactionscommunal and life-sustaining interactions between the living and the dead;
between mother and infant; and between man and woman, and oppressive and
threatening interactions between master and slave, slave catcher and escaped
slave, white and black. Among much else, what Beloved teaches is that the
spirituality, the sense of self-hood, and the communities created through silent
and silenced interactions-through dance, through laughter, through death,
through birth, through sign and through touch-are as morally important, and
constitutive, as the textually saturated pontificating "individuals" and communities created by a literary canon, whether critical or celebratory of the
legalism with which it interacts. What Beloved teaches, again, among much else,
is that we should attend to those non-textual and even non-verbal interactions and
the communities they create, and not only to the texts we produce, if we want to
understand and assess the moral quality of our governing institutions.
There is, then, contained in Beloved, a quite powerful critique of the Critical
Project itself-which in essence simply advocates the use of one verbal construct
(literature) to criticize yet another (law). Our moral foundation, Beloved teaches,
emanates not only from the verbal lessons we inherit, but also from our
profoundly non-verbal interactions, from birth to friendship, mothering, sexuality,
touch, and death. One lesson of at least this canonical "outsider" work is that the
use of verbal "canons" of any sort-outsider, insider, or in-between-gives short
shrift to our non-verbal forms of interaction and the non-verbal communities they
form. If that is right, then even the Critical Project arguably occasions a critical
injustice of its own. It pits the lessons of one sort of verbal text-literatureagainst that of another-law. What is elided entirely are the lessons of our nonverbal interactions, whether oppressive, intimate, or liberatory, and the communities of oppression, intimacy, and liberation those interactions create.
Susan Glaspell's twentieth century novella, A Jury of Her Peers57 gives rise
to a similar dilemma. A Jury of Her Peersis about the spousal murder of a husband by an emotionally and possibly physically abused wife, as told through the
eyes of two neighboring women from the larger community. The two women
accompanied the prosecutor and sheriff to the farmhouse to investigate the crime,
and eventually, while sitting in the guilty woman's kitchen, discover and then
suppress incriminating evidence, deciding on their own that the murder was
justified.58 Although not by any means as great a work as Beloved, A Jury of Her
Peers is nevertheless "canonical" at least within feminist communities: it is much
taught, discussed, and criticized as a foundational text of twentieth century
feminism. It is a natural candidate for inclusion in any canon of critical works on
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law. It is a story about political marginalization and domestic abuse, and it is
unquestionably jurisprudential. It can readily ground a jurisprudential critique of
law, and it does so squarely from the perspective of an outsider.
Yet, like Beloved, the actual message of A Jury of Her Peersuncomfortably
undercuts even an expanded conception of the critical project. A Jury of Her
Peersis about many things, but one thing it is about is silence, and silent protest.
The wives who sit in judgment in that farmhouse kitchen of the clearly guilty
farm wife, refuse to convey to the authorities the evidence they have uncovered
of the wife's guilt. This is itself a crime of silence. The evidence they uncover and
refuse to disclose is a strangled songbird-his song needlessly and cruelly
silenced by the woman's husband, apparently in an act of rage which in turn
prompted his own killing at the hands of his silent wife. The childless, friendless,
isolated farmwife who committed the homicide had lived in a silent and
emotionally dead world with a non-communicative and abusive husband, and she
responded to her silent hell with a crime of silence-strangling her husband in the
middle of his sleep. The wives who visit the farmhouse after the homicide fault
themselves for their silent neglect of their neighbor's silent suffering. And all of
this action takes place, of course, against the backdrop of a legal system which
itself silences, by excluding the views, perspectives, and voices of women from
juries in properly constituted courts of law.
To be sure, A Jury of Her Peers is clearly critical of all of this silence.
Nevertheless, not only the homicide itself, but every other morally significant act
in the novella is an act of silence, from the strangling of the bird, to the refusal to
turn over the evidence. The speech in the story, in fact, stands in marked contrast:
both the speech of the sheriff and prosecutor as they search the home, and much
of the speech of the wives in the kitchen is pointedly banal. The norms to which
they give expression are insipid. In this novella, as in Beloved, it is the acts of
silence that form the communities that matter-communities of oppression, of
solidarity, of loyalty, of life, and of death. It is the acts of silence, not the
pontificating acts of verbosity, that constitute the contours of the lives for which
the reader learns to care.
It is not, however, fatal to the critical project that the included voices of
outsiders in a newly invigorated and more inclusive canon at least on occasion
counsel greater attentiveness to actions and to silences, and to the communities
thereby created, and a little less to "what we say." First, of course, it is in keeping
with the "anti-wordiness" message of Weisberg's seminal contribution to the
critical project. It is also in keeping with Robert Cover's eloquent plea that the
"law and literature" movement heed the violence law does, and not only the
principles it expresses. 9 Most important, though, it is in keeping with at least one
goal (if not the only goal) of literature, whether canonical or not: to shed light not

59.

1210

Cover, supra note 26, at 1601.

1996/The LiteraryLawyer
on our subjective "texts," but on the quality of our internal lives. That outsider
literature, like outsider jurisprudence, directs and enables us forcefully toward an
examination of those lives, as much as possible unfiltered by the disorienting
gauze of the dominant culture's defining texts, is a reflection of that literature's
strength.
CONCLUSION

Let me return to the question I posed at the outset: Is there any shared agenda,
or point, held in common by these two projects? Is there any rapprochement on
the horizon between the literary lawyer and the literary legal critic? Is there any
common ground between White's celebration of the communitarian promise of
the legal and literary word, and Weisberg's denunciation of the resentment
animating the pontificating lawyer? Between a view of the legal or literary word
as an act of hope, and a view of the same word as an act of legitimation, hypocrisy, resentment, oppression, or injustice? In response to the last question, I think
not-these views are incompatible. But it doesn't follow that law and literature
have no common agenda. Rather, the agenda is to engage precisely this argument,
and it is an argument squarely over the nature of literature and language-and
hence over human nature-no less than over the nature of law. We are language
using animals, and one thing that means is that we can create both rules of law
and works of literature. But its not clear what, if anything, follows from that,
ethically. Language facility alone, perhaps, guarantees neither that we will or will
not be on the side of the angels. What we need to explore is our ability to turn
language to good or evil. We need to explore the ways in which the promissory
nature of language, including the language of law, can deepen our community
bonds and bring us closer to defensible ideals, and the ways in which the use of
language exacerbates and then obfuscates our seemingly insatiable appetite for
domination and cruelty. It is the shared goal of the law and literature movement,
to illuminate the role of language in both kinds of interactive communities, and
it is the common agenda of that movement to do so, in part, through cross examinations not just of our legal and literary canon, but of our utterly non-canonical
and even non-verbal interactive communities and natures as well.
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